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Abstract  
From a socio-political point of view, the results of the Israeli 2015 elections reflect an ongoing stagnation that is 
described in detail in this research. This stagnation is often explained by theories of social collective identities. However, 
none of the theories examines how group identities are created. Consequently, this study explains how different forms 
of national ethos shape political identities and interweave with them. 
Relying on a wide set of data from the National Resilience Survey launched by the National Security Studies Center at 
Haifa University, this research examines the way Israeli political parties differ according to voters' attitudes on matters 
of national ethos. The findings show how opposing parties correspond with the two distinct forms of national ethos. 
However, the data also reveals that the ethos clash is not necessarily a dichotomy, but rather a continuum where various 
parties are located along a spectrum between the poles.  
Keywords: group identity, national ethos, voter behavior, political stagnation, republicanism, liberalism. 
1. Introduction 
A friend of mine called me excitedly on the morning of March 17, 2015. "Would you believe it"? He could hardly 
conceal his agitation. "The Likud – they don't even have an ideological platform! I have been going through all the 
parties' websites to compare their ideas, and apparently the Likud did not even bother to publically declare any of their 
ideology"! 
"If Likud did have a platform," I asked, "would you vote for them"? 
"Of course not"! My friend exclaimed, "You know me – I have never considered Likud as an option"! 
"In that case," I asked wryly, "why should Likud have an ideological platform"? 
"You have a point there," my friend admitted. 
"What's more," I concluded, "perhaps none of the parties really need a platform"! 
As evening came that day, the tension in my political science class at the university was at its height, just like 
everywhere else in the country. Together with several of my students, who wanted to hear my analyses in real time, I 
was waiting for the television sample counts. When the time came and the counts were finally broadcast, I could repeat 
to my students exactly what I had been telling them for years now: there is nothing new. There is an ongoing minor 
electoral advantage for the right-wing parties, together with significantly better chances for them to form governmental 
coalitions. Borrowing from the words of Ecclesiastes, the thing that hath been is that which shall be; and that which is 
done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun (Ecclesiastes 1:9, King James Bible).          
From a socio-political point of view, the results of the 2015 elections reflect stagnation. It seems that the splits along 
social cleavages that shape Israeli society and divide it into its various groups have not changed for at least the last forty 
years. Although the left-right position allegedly embodies issue preferences mainly on the question of the occupied 
territories, the phenomenon of political stagnation is commonly explained by theories of political identity (Shaefer and 
Weimann, 2005).  
There is considerable consensus that collective identities are central to politics. Much of the empirical foundation of this 
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consensus derives from the correlations between social category membership and vote choice found in survey data 
(Dickson and Scheve, 2006). Group identity is considered a crucial factor in voter behavior because it involves a 
subjective sense of membership and tends to include self-concept and a perceived common fate. An individual is not 
merely aware of his membership in a certain group; social identity also involves the value and emotional significance 
that are attached to this membership (Tajfel, 1981). Hence understanding the psychology of group identity has long 
been perceived as an important key in gaining deep insights in the study of political behavior, and more specifically – 
into voters' decisions. Social identities are often based on ethnicity, religion, gender, and other personal characteristics 
such as age and education; these are core factors that often generate political cohesion through shared concepts and by 
imposing conformity to certain norms of political activity (Huddy, 2001; 2003; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Miller et al., 
1981; Simon and Klandermans, 2001).  
Scholarly literature indicates that socio-demographic groups based on social class, age, gender, or marital status exhibit 
only very modest levels of political cohesion, whereas political identities prove much more effective. Partisanship and 
left-right ideology are collective identities that are considered to play a central role in shaping the dynamics of public 
opinion and electoral choice. Focusing on the American case, researchers have indicated how identifying with a 
particular party means not only holding a set of beliefs but also feeling a sense of psychological attachment to the 
political group. Thus, political identity entails abiding by norms concerning shared political beliefs and adopting the 
so-called correct group position on a political candidate, political party, policy issue, or a specific course of political 
action (Campbell. 1960).  
The examples that researchers commonly use when analyzing political identities and their impact are not only 
Republican and Democrat in the U.S., Conservative and Labor in the U.K., Social Democrat and Christian Democrat in 
Germany, but also – Labor and Likud in Israel (Dalton, 2009; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Shamir and Arian, 1999).  
However, most studies concentrate mainly on identity mobilization – that is, a given situation after an identity has 
already been acquired. The way group identities are created remains largely unexamined (Huddy, 2001). Partisan 
identity defines voter behavior, but does not necessarily indicate where it emerges from. Where, then, do identities in 
Israeli politics originate? Why do Israeli citizens choose to identify with a certain group, represented by a particular set 
of parties, and not to relate to another political environment? This study suggests that in Israeli politics the specific type 
of national ethos that people hold is the core factor that dictates, to a large extent, their political identity.  
In order to comprehend the strange phenomenon of political stagnation in Israel, we shall first establish this situation 
based on election data since 1977. In an attempt to explain these unchanging outcomes, the theory of ethos clash in 
Israeli society will be introduced. Next, based on data stemming from a large national survey, our research will validate 
the assumption that fundamental concepts of one national ethos or another, which create group identity, form the core 
factor that eventually determines how people vote.   
2. The Israeli Case Study 
In order to understand the unchanging political setting, let us first present the protagonists of the Israeli political arena. 
Although names of parties change from time to time and parties tend to merge and to separate, to dissemble and to 
reassemble, the social groups remain the same. This principle is demonstrated in table 1: The Political Left-Right 
Stagnation, where the major actors of the Israeli political game are introduced. The reference in this paper is only to 
parties that succeeded in maintaining seats at Knesset. 
Table 1. The Political Left-Right Stagnation  
(Data taken from the Knesset official website: https://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng_hist_all.htm retrieved on 
October 1, 2015) 
Year  Left wing + Center + Arab parties Right wing + religious parties 
 
  
Parties (seats) 
 
Total 
number 
of seats 
 
 
Parties (seats) 
 
Total 
number 
of seats 
1977 Labor (32); Ratz (1); Dash (15);  
Sheli (2); Lamed Ayin (1);  
Arab parties (6) 
 
57 Likud (43); Mafdal (12);  
Shlomzion (2); Flatto Sharon (1);  
Yahadut Hatora (5) 
63 
1981 Labor (47); Ratz (1); Shinuy (2); 
Telem (2); Arab parties (4) 
56 Likud (48); Mafdal (6);  
Tehiya (3); Tami (3);  
Yahadut Hatora (4) 
64 
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1984 Labor (44); Ratz (3); Shinuy (3); 
Yahad (3); Arab parties (6) 
59 Likud (41); Mafdal (4);  
Tehiya (5); Tami (1);  
Morasha (2); Kach (1);  
Ometz (1); Shas (4);  
Yahadut Hatora (2) 
 
61 
1988 Labor (39); Ratz (5); Shinuy (2); 
Mapam (3); Arab parties (6) 
55 Likud (40); Mafdal (5);  
Tehiya (3); Tzomet (2);  
Moledet (2); Shas (6);  
Yahadut Hatora (7) 
 
65 
1992 Labor (44); Meretz (12);  
Arab parties (5) 
61 Likud (32); Mafdal (6);  
Tzomet (8); Moledet (3);  
Shas (6); Yahadut Hatora (4) 
 
59 
1996 Labor (34); Meretz (9);  
Haderech Hashlishit (4);  
Arab parties (9) 
56 Likud (32); Mafdal (9);  
Israel Ba'aliya (7); Moledet (2);  
Shas (10); Yahadut Hatora (4) 
 
64 
1999 Labor (26); Meretz (10);  
Shinuy (6); Merkaz (6); 
Am Echad (2); Arab parties (10) 
60 Likud (19); Mafdal (5);  
Ichud Leumi (4); Israel Ba'aliya (6);  
Israel Beytenu (4); Shas (17);  
Yahadut Hatora (5) 
 
60 
2003 Labor (19); Meretz (6);  
Shinuy (15); Am Echad (3);  
Arab parties (8) 
51 Likud (38); Mafdal (6);  
Ichud Leumi (7);  
Israel Ba'aliya (2);  
Shas (11); Yahadut Hatora (5) 
 
69 
2006 Kadima (29); Labor (19); 
Meretz (5); Gimlaim (7);  
Arab parties (10) 
70 Likud (12); Mafdal (9);  
Israel Beytenu (11); Shas (12);  
Yahadut Hatora (6) 
 
50 
2009 Kadima (28); Labor (13);  
Meretz (3); Arab parties (11) 
55 Likud (27); Mafdal (3);  
Ichud Leumi (4);  
Israel Beytenu (15);  
Shas (11); Yahadut Hatora (5) 
 
65 
2013 Labor (15); Meretz (5);  
Yesh Atid (11); Hatnua (6); 
Kadima (2); Arab parties (11) 
59 Likud + Israel Beytenu (31);  
Mafdal (12); Shas (11);  
Yahadut Hatora (7) 
 
61 
2015 Labor (24); Meretz (5);  
Yesh Atid (11); Arab parties (13) 
53 Likud (30); Mafdal (8);  
Israel Beytenu (6); Kulanu (10); Shas 
(7); Yahadut Hatora (6) 
67 
 
Legend 
Arab parties = several parties representing the Arab minority, counted here together 
Am Echad = a socialist faction of Labor 
Dash = a centralist party advocating democracy and change 
Flatto Sharon = a party led by Shmuel Flatto Sharon 
Gimlaim = a party representing pensioners 
Haderech Hashlishit = a party opposing withdrawal from the Golan Heights 
Hatnua = a liberal party 
Ichud Leumi = alliance of nationalist parties 
Israel Ba'aliya = a party that represented the interests of Russian Jewish immigrants 
Israel Beytenu = a securalist nationalist party 
Kach = a far-right nationalistic party 
Kadima = a centrist and liberal party advocating withdrawal from territories 
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Kulanu = a centrist party maintained mainly by former Likud activists 
Labor = social democratic former hegemonic party 
Lamed Ayin = a liberal party 
Likud = the major right-wing party 
Mafdal = the national religious party 
Mapam = a Marxist socialist workers' party 
Meretz = a secular social democratic party 
Merkaz = a center party 
Moledet = a party that advocated voluntary transfer of Arab population 
Morasha = a religious ultra-orthodox right-wing party  
Ometz = a right-wing party 
Ratz = a movement for civil rights and peace 
Shas = religious ultra-orthodox Sephardi party 
Sheli = a left-wing party advocating peace 
Shinuy = a secular anti-clerical free market liberal party 
Shlomzion = a party led by Ariel Sharon 
Tami = a Jewish Sephardi ethnic party 
Tehiya = a right-wing party that supported Israeli sovereignty over the territories 
Telem = a party led by Moshe Dayan 
Tzomet = a secular right-wing party 
Yachad = a centrist party led by Ezer Weizman 
Yahadut Hatora = the representation of the religious ultra-orthodoxy 
Yesh Atid = a secular middle class party 
As seen in Table 1, there is an ongoing tide with one or two, sometimes even three or four, mandates moving from one 
political bloc to another. In 1992, a left wing government was formed for the first time, after five consecutive 
campaigns and 15 years of right-wing leadership. However, a close look into the way mandates were distributed reveals 
that Likud as the main right-wing party may have been defeated but the overall proportion between the two political 
blocs remained just the way it had been throughout the two decades that preceded the 1992 elections.  
Another change allegedly took place between the 2003 and 2006 campaigns. In the course of three years, Likud 
dropped from 38 seats in the Knesset to 12 seats, the right wing lost 20 mandates and the left wing won them. This, 
again, was merely an illusion that corrected itself within the course of no more than another three years, in the 2009 
campaign. The reason for the temporary change of the political map was the emergence of Kadima under the leadership 
of Ariel Sharon, former Likud leader. Since the roots of voter decision making are based on identities, Sharon could 
transfer thousands of settlers from their homes, and then transfer himself from the right wing to the left wing and still 
gain the support of the same electorate. With Sharon no longer around by 2009, the left wing shrank again into its 
natural less-than-sixty-seats situation and the system returned to its normal stagnation.  
A simple arithmetical mean calculation summing all the left-wing mandates since 1977 (altogether 692) and dividing 
them by the number of Knesset election campaigns (12) leads to the conclusion that on average the left-wing maintains 
between 57 and 58 seats in the Knesset. Correspondingly, the right wing has on average a constant advantage of four to 
five mandates. The numbers, of course, do not necessarily reveal the ability or inability of each leading party, Likud on 
the right and Labor on the left, to establish a ruling coalition. Indeed, a national unity government was formed 
repeatedly throughout decades, institutionalizing the cooperation between parties of opposing political blocs.       
3. Theory 
Ethos is widely defined as the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide a particular orientation to a society. It 
combines dominant societal beliefs in a particular structure, and lends meaning to a specific group's societal life 
(Bar-Tal, 2000). The national ethos of a country is the array of particularistic-shared values and traditions from which a 
people's images of its future and its past are envisioned. The ethos integrates the community into a unit that believes in a 
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common mutual destiny, and forms the foundation for its unique identity as a distinctive social group. The integrative 
ethos is also the moral source for the national community's informal social controls; it enforces commitments upon 
society and drives its members into a largely voluntary social order. Thus, the ethos of a nation holds in fact one of the 
most important keys to a people's ability to unite into a cohesive society (Etzioni, 2009). 
The use of the expression in political science goes back to the German romanticism of the late 18
th
 century with 
philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder introducing the term Zeitgeist, which translates into "the spirit of the age." Inspired 
by philosopher Friedrich Hegel's concept of mind and moral fiber, Herder spoke of the cultural, ethical and political 
climate in which a nation evolves and crystallizes (Barnard, 2003). These ideas project a strong association between the 
ethos of a nation and representations of the long history that the nation claims to have. The features of a community, 
some scholars claim, originated in the historical stages when the mental maps of the people, their prevailing culture, 
norms and ideas had first been cultivated (Rothstein, 2000).  
In its national context, the idea of a collective memory resides deep in international studies theorist Benedict Anderson's 
comprehension of the nation as an imagined community. The national identity, according to Anderson, has a symbolic 
and constructed nature, and by utilizing the communications media it is capable of reaching dispersed populations 
(Anderson, 1983). The collective identity of a nation as a unique combination of a public that shares mutual values and 
beliefs that lie in its common narratives -- that is, its constructed collective memory -- and of the united role that its 
members believe fate has destined for them in this world. This is the national ethos, containing the foundation of the 
collective identity through both a sense of a certain duty that the nation is obligated to fulfill and a set of common goals 
that is intended for the people as a united entity to achieve (Lewin, 2012).  
That being said, one should firmly bear in mind that the term “ethos,” particularly national ethos, carries with it more 
than just accumulated and interpreted collective remembrances. It also encompasses the enduring shared beliefs that 
characterize a society. These beliefs are organized around leading themes, myths, values, ideologies, concerns, and the 
group's self-image; they form necessary conditions for the performance of social systems, functioning as lenses through 
which each member discerns the spirit of his social group (Bar-Tal, 2000; Giddens, 1984; Somers and Gibson, 1994). 
Inquiring into the nature of different manifestations of national ethos reveals two distinct forms: a national republican 
ethos and a national liberal ethos. Whereas the former inspires fighting forces and struggling populations, the latter 
promotes deep beliefs in appeasement, reconciliation and pacification. The republican ethos can stimulate the 
mobilization of people into defending their country and serve as an inspiring instrument that will encourage them to 
bravely protect their national assets. A liberal ethos, on the other hand, can hardly tunnel collective energies into tasks 
where fierce fighting is needed (Lewin, 2014). 
Within the Israeli society, an ongoing tussle plays out, where a national republican ethos and a national liberal ethos are 
constantly competing in an effort to shape the ideals of the nation, and consequently – to influence its future regarding 
some of the prominent issues that need collective decision making. At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, a clear 
competition can be delineated between two rival forms of Israeli national ethos: the republican ethos, deeply embedded 
in the traditional Zionist attitudes; and the liberal ethos, led primarily by believers in post-Zionist concepts.  
The republican ethos was shaped and carved into the writings and opinions of various Zionist leaders throughout the 
20
th
 century. Consolidated through decades of political and physical struggle, some of its values have eventually 
become the very principles of the State of Israel. Its core belief is the Zionist ideology and the particular doctrines that 
derive from it: the moral justification of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel, where all the Jews will gather and sustain 
their eternal historic continuity as a national community. Parallel doctrines consist of the denial of others' rights to settle 
the country, particularly the Palestinians, and of viewing their aspirations to do so as proof of vicious intentions to 
harass the Jewish people. Led by the republican ethos, Israeli culture and the Israeli education system established a 
national identity that was based on the concept that the State of Israel was under a constant and everlasting threat of 
extinction. In spite of the collective threat, according to the Israeli republican ethos, inherent Jewish strength enabled 
the nation to overcome its enemies by virtue of courage, diligence, ingenuity, and above all – moral superiority (Oren, 
2009).  
The liberal ethos has its roots in a post-Zionist attitude. During the 1980s a group of scholars known as the new 
historians cast doubt on the most basic Zionist ideology that provided the essential justification for Israel's very right to 
exist. Some of these scholars were more extreme than others, but altogether they drew a new historic picture, furnishing 
an alternative interpretation of the state's past, viewing the Zionist movement as a militant colonialist endeavor, based 
on the exploitation, subjugation and uprooting of the Arab population of the country. Sociologist Baruch Kimmerling 
was perhaps the first to point out how the Jewish state had been built on the ruins of an Arab society that supposedly 
existed on this territory for hundreds of years. The Jews, according to the new historic paradigm, took the 1948 war as 
an opportunity to inherit the country violently. The formation of Israeli society and the settlement of the land were based 
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on incursion into a populated country and replacing its local indigenous inhabitants (Kimmerling, 1983; Pappe, 1992). 
The rival forms of ethos totally contradict one another, they collide with each other, and they outline one of the deepest 
ideological cleavages that separates Israeli society – at times even tearing it up. No comprehension of the dynamics of 
Israeli politics can be fully achieved without a fundamental understanding of the clash between these different forms of 
ethos; no sociological analysis of Israeli society can be complete without an inquiry into these two contradictory 
doctrinal sets of values and beliefs that split the nation (Lewin, 2014). 
This research examines, then, the way Israeli political parties differ according to voters' attitudes on matters of national 
ethos. I referred to four major issues of national ethos: (1) republican patriotism; (2) republican tendency to advocate 
siege mentality; (3) republican inclination towards trust in political leadership; (4) liberal support of the Supreme Court 
as the dominant social institute. 
3.1 Patriotism  
Patriotic loyalty is considered an unconditional love, a compulsive commitment to the object of admiration that 
eventually leads to what some scholars refer to as an obsessive dedication (Tamir, 1997). This point of view reveals a 
convention that when it comes to matters of war and peace, any personal logic should be rejected in the name of 
patriotism. In patriotic instances of sacrifice, people forfeit either years of their lives, their health, parts of their bodies, 
or their very existence for the sake of their country (Somerville, 1981).  
Finding examples that fully envelop the attributes of patriotism is an easy task in the case of the Israeli republican ethos, 
because contemporary Israeli history is paved with events where people followed the patriotic pattern, forming – each 
in his own way – models for others to follow and imitate. Yet the ultimate exemplar, forming the archetype of a patriot 
within the Zionist legacy, is undoubtedly Joseph Trumpeldor. This Zionist leader was a Russian Jew who volunteered 
and excelled in the Russian army of the Russo-Japanese war. Later, he became a Zionist pioneer and was active in 
building Palestine and defending the Jewish settlements.  
In 1920, when commanding a few untrained fighters and attacked by hundreds of Shiites, Trumpeldor was fatally shot. 
On his deathbed, he articulated the monumental statement that he had previously written in letters to his comrades, 
"never mind; it is good to die for our country." Trumpeldor's outstanding figure would from then on light the spirit of 
Jewish settlement and defense, his last words imprinted on the Zionist heritage, symbolizing the ultimate expression of 
Israeli love of country throughout ages to come (Segev, 1984). 
The patriotic themes within the liberal ethos, on the other hand, are diminished by other current social trends. The 
globalization process, which immensely influences the liberal ethos, encourages individualism, which in turn 
jeopardizes the concept of supremacy of the national social group. Globalization, highly corresponding with modern 
capitalism, is considered to re-cast human behavior from that of a social animal into that of a homo economicus. Media, 
workplace and educational systems instill material self-interest as the leading social norm. Consequently, the more 
others are perceived as acting from self-interest, the more each citizen is encouraged to respond accordingly with a 
competitive attitude (Nikelly, 2000). 
The primary assumption of the liberal ethos is that peace, rather than traditional national collective goals, is the sacred 
value for which mankind should strive. Moreover, the essence of the liberal ethos is the value of life. Land, history, and 
divine promises are no longer worth dying for when life is the alternative. In his March 13, 1995 speech for 
Trumpeldor's Memorial Day, Yitzhak Rabin rephrased the hero's last words, "it is good to die for our country"; claiming 
that death and bereavement are not destined by fate, he preached a reversal of Trumpeldor's heritage, coining a new 
conceptual sentence: "it is good to live for our country." 
It seems, then, that the interpretation of patriotism through the lens of the liberal ethos leaves us with merely a shadow 
of patriotism. At the end of the day, whereas patriotism is in fact the backbone of the republican ethos, it is rather alien 
to the liberal ethos.  
3.2 Siege Mentality 
The republican ethos views Israel as still struggling, due to outbreaks of war from time to time, for its safety. Issues of 
national security are therefore naturally dominant, in line with the ways in which perceptions of citizenship and people's 
political standpoints are formed within this ethos. The more dangerous the situation is perceived to be, the more reality 
is viewed as a condition of siege, into which the whole country is put by its ruthless enemies (Arian, 1995; Horowitz, 
1982).  
The Holocaust, according to the republican ethos, was not the last historic experience of a nation that dwells alone. The 
chronicles of the Jewish-Arab conflict contributed to the development of a victimized self-perception and have been 
viewed as the direct continuation of the persecution of the Jewish people; accordingly, all of Israel’s military activities 
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have been perceived as acts of self-defense (Harkabi, 1977; Zafran, 2003).  
Things look very different from the liberal ethos point of view; its basic claim is that its rival, the republican ethos, has 
built into the Israeli political culture a threat perception that leads extensively to militarism. Extreme emergencies, 
during which the very existence of a state is threatened from the outside, draw attention away from lesser domestic 
disputes and thus contribute to the consolidation of the political community (Evrigenis, 2008). Thus, a fairly cynical, 
though not necessarily unrealistic, viewpoint leads to the claim, on these grounds, that political leadership had better do 
its best to keep some of the threats active so that society continually demonstrates a rally-round-the-flag syndrome 
(Mueller, 1973).  
The concept of a no-choice war, applied mainly to the 1948 war, has been replaced by the claim, held by liberal ethos 
proponents, that Israel has almost always chosen its wars. Even the defensive campaign of 1967, according to some 
liberal ethos believers, was not merely a reaction against aggressive Arab forces threatening to tear the small country 
apart, but rather a sequence of quarrelsome Israeli policies. According to a liberal historic perception, the Israeli nuclear 
breakthrough was the factor that persuaded Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to attack before the manufacture of 
an atomic bomb was completed (Aronson, 1992). Likewise, the frequent use of Israeli air power against the Syrians 
drove them to what eventually became a violent confrontation, not to mention the fact that capturing the Golan Heights 
was totally an Israeli initiative unnecessary for the termination of the 1967 war (Cohen, 1992).  
3.3 Political Trust 
Trust in political leadership is an important feature of republicanism. Beyond their commitment to republican norms of 
citizenship, people with the republican approach rely on one another to display their civil commitments. The republican 
citizens confidently put themselves in the hands of public officials − for example, politicians or bureaucrats − even 
when this trust is not supported by the existence of effective constraints on these officials. Republican citizens treat each 
other with the same social trust, and they are prepared to do so even when these fellow citizens are strangers. This 
willingness to accept an inevitable degree of trust in public authorities, relying almost blindly on their virtue, as well as 
the readiness to be vulnerable to other citizens, are essential conditions for a society to prosper, from the republican 
point of view. Political and social trust, according to republicanism, enable cooperation of associations and movements 
that eventually lead to social success (Pettit, 1999).            
Republicans will be less skeptical of the possibility of state intervention, because they do not view state action, provided 
it is properly constrained, as an inherent affront to liberty. Hence, republican government may tend to be big in the 
range of responsibilities that it assumes, and often involves itself in five broad areas of policy making: external defense, 
internal protection, personal independence, economic prosperity, and public life (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Pettit, 
1999). 
3.4 Judiciary System  
Liberalism, in its essence, is focused on the individual. It stresses the human desire to live in a social and political 
environment where each person's inner complexity and creativity is acknowledged and respected. Liberalism's promise 
is to enable one to manifest different facets of his unique self and to enjoy a rich and varied inner life; it is the pursuit of 
personal happiness and the virtue of diversity and of individualism (Avnon and De-Shalit, 1999; Schwartzmantel, 
1998). 
Whereas republicanism advocates trust in the political system, liberalism seeks institutions that will eventually limit 
political leadership for the sake of maintaining individuals' rights. Montesquieu established the definitive language of 
liberalism by highlighting the ongoing tensions between power and liberty and by searching for regulating mechanisms 
that would ensure the superiority of civil rights (Manent, 1995). 
The regulating social mechanism in Israeli society, according to the liberal approach, is the Supreme Court, as the final 
legal authority. The Supreme Court acts as a court of appeals from the rulings of the District Courts in criminal, civil, 
and administrative cases. It may issue orders for state authorities, local authorities, their officials and other bodies that 
fulfill public functions to perform various acts or to refrain from performing them. Particularly during recent decades, 
the Supreme Court has served as the leading institution in Israeli society for the promotion of human rights and liberal 
democratic values. Its rulings have shaped and buttressed protection of fundamental rights, even as the nation lacked a 
formal Constitution. In fact, there is wide consensus that the Supreme Court has formulated de-facto an unwritten bill of 
rights and court-protected fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, using strict standards often borrowed 
from the American jurisprudence (Carmi, 2005). 
4. Method  
The data for this study stems from the National Resilience Survey launched annually since 2000 by the National 
Security Studies Center at Haifa University (Ben-Dor et al., 2014). This large poll encompasses a representative sample 
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of the general Israeli adult population. At each point in time 2000 respondents are sampled, of which approximately 
1600 are Jews. The data is gathered by means of identical large-scale telephone surveys. The questionnaires are also 
translated into Russian in order to ensure that the whole population is suitably covered, and consequently tested for 
validity and appropriateness in order to guarantee that they accurately reflect the Hebrew version. The survey questions 
are implemented by a Likert scale, where respondents are called to rate from 1 to 6 their acceptance of phrases that 
express the various factors that are inquired about. 
The questions that were chosen for this study are those that enable us to focus on republican or liberal themes. 
Altogether, I have analyzed four themes represented by six sets of questions. 
4.1 Republican version of patriotism 
4.1.1. Questions regarding patriotism   
I love Israel and I am proud of Israel. 
When Israel is condemned abroad I feel irritated about it. 
I am annoyed when the Israeli flag is being burnt. 
A light threat on the security of the state is enough to justify a serious limit of democracy. 
Israel is my home and I have no intention ever to leave it. 
Every citizen ought to serve either in the military forces or in any other civil service. 
4.1.2 Questions regarding collective self-justification  
Israel has a just case in its disputes with other countries. 
Every military Israeli action is a justified one. 
4.2 Republican tendency for siege mentality 
4.2.1. Questions regarding fear of the enemy  
The threat posed by its enemies is very dangerous for Israel. 
An enemy state might assault Israel. 
4.2.2. Questions regarding militancy toward the enemy   
It is important to implement military activity even if there are innocent casualties among the enemy's citizens. 
Attacking Israel's enemies is essential in preventing future aggression of these enemies. 
4.3. Republican attitude towards trust in political leadership 
Rating trust in Knesset (1 to 6).  
4.4. Liberal highlighting of the Supreme Court  
Rating trust in the Supreme Court (1 to 6).  
5. Results  
The outcomes of the t-test that compares the means of the four different themes are presented here in table 2: The 
Left-Right Split Reflecting Ethos Clash in Israeli Society. 
Table 2. The Left-Right Split Reflecting Ethos Clash in Israeli Society 
National ethos issues Left wing + center parties 
 
Right wing + religious parties 
  
Meretz 
 
Labor 
 
Yesh 
Atid 
 
 
Likud 
 
Kulanu 
 
Israel 
Beytenu 
 
Mafdal 
 
Shas 
 
Yahadut 
Hatora 
Patriotism  Patriotism 
 
3.8056 4.6177 4.9964 5.2828 5.1379 5.3217 5.1883 4.5644 4.0312 
Collective 
self-Justification 
 
 
 
3.4032 
 
 
4.3639 
 
 
4.9632 
 
 
5.3404 
 
 
5.1765 
 
 
5.1351 
 
 
5.4667 
 
 
5.3488 
 
 
5.0290 
Siege 
mentality 
Fear of enemy 
 
 
3.0806 
 
3.5121 
 
3.6367 
 
4.1401 
 
3.8046 
 
4.3275 
 
3.5736 
 
3.9778 
 
3.4883 
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Militancy 
 
2/3306 3.4799 4.2212 4.9084 4.5584 4.8051 4.7861 4.9500 4.2419 
Trust  Political 
 trust 
 
 
2.8548 
 
3.2064 
 
3.0863 
 
3.7096 
 
3.0345 
 
3.3158 
 
3.8667 
 
3.6000 
 
2.4366 
Trust in 
Supreme court 
 
 
5.3548 
 
 
5.1316 
 
 
4.9638 
 
 
3.9755 
 
 
4.2209 
 
 
3.8304 
 
 
3.5210 
 
 
2.8636 
 
 
1.8592 
 
6. Discussion 
An observation of the data makes clear that the distinct differences are those that occur between the two major rivals in 
the Israeli political arena, the Likud and Labor. On the republican themes, Likud means are significantly higher than 
those of Labor, with 5.2828 on patriotism as opposed to 4.6177 and even a larger gap of 5.3404 on collective 
self-justification as opposed to Labor's means of 4.3639. The means for fear of enemy assaults also reveal a significant 
gap between Likud, with 4.1401, and Labor, with 3.5121. Militancy means reveal even a sharper difference, with 
Likud's 4.9084 versus Labor's 3.4799. Accordingly, on the third theme of a republican scale, political trust, Likud voters 
have also higher means, 3.7096, in comparison with their Labor opponents whose means reach only 3.2064. When 
examining the liberal scale, where trust in the Supreme Court is measured, the scores are, consequently, switched, with 
Likud's means as low as 3.9755 and Labor’s rising to 5.1316.  
The differences between parties within each political camp also reflect closeness to the appropriate national ethos. 
Meretz is closer than Labor to the liberal ethos, in the sense that on each of the republican themes it scores lower means 
(particularly in patriotism, collective self-justification and militancy), and on the liberal scale referring to the Supreme 
Court it scores higher means of public trust. In the same sense one can observe how Yesh Atid, a center party that even 
participated in a right-wing government following the 2013 elections, is within the boundaries of the left wing, but 
scores means that resemble the results of voters from the right.  
Inside the right-wing bloc, there is a difference between Likud and its religious partners, yet essentially one can observe 
how they are all much closer to the republican ethos than to the liberal one. Unsurprisingly, the liberal means of 
ultra-orthodox Shas and Yahadut Hatora voters are as small as 2.8636 (Shas) and 1.8592 (Yahadut Hatora), very 
significantly less than equivalent Likud means. On the republican scale, ultra-orthodox religious parties score less than 
Likud on the patriotic factor but score extensively higher on the scale of collective self-justification. There is a 
difference also between Shas, which is closer to the republican ethos, and Yahadut Hatora. Whereas Shas voters score 
high on themes of siege mentality, with 3.9778 for fear of enemy and 4.9500 for militancy, Yahadut Hatora's means are 
merely 3.4883 and 4.2419 respectively.  
Mafdal's means are closer to the republican ethos on almost every theme than those of Likud, although the differences 
can be considered minor. Predictably, then, Mafdal voters' trust in the Supreme Court is lower than that of Likud voters. 
Israel Beytenu also differs from Likud, and like Mafdal proves closer to the republican ethos. Although in themes of 
patriotism Avigdor Liberman's voters are slightly lower in means than their equivalent Likud supporters, on other 
themes they seem to be leading the republican story. The tendencies are a little mixed, but altogether both parties, Likud 
and Israel Beytenu, who have been in close partnership particularly during the previous campaign, indicate that they 
share a common republican national ethos.              
An interesting case is that of Kulanu. This party allegedly used the ticket of a centrist party, just like Yesh Atid, focusing 
its propaganda on economic and cost-of-living issues. However, the party is led by Moshe Kahlon; Kahlon was elected 
to the Knesset during the 2000s after twice, consecutively, winning top places on Likud's list in the party's primaries 
(Haaretz, January 13, 2006). He was considered an outstanding minister in the Likud and Prime Minister Netanyahu 
even addressed his ministers in a government meeting on June 19, 2011, exclaiming "You should be Kahlon-ites"! 
(Haaretz, June 20, 2011). It is of no surprise, then, that Kulanu fixed its campaign on Likud voters using the slogan "A 
true Likudnik votes Kahlon."  Consequently, the party's messages referred to Likud under Menachem Begin and called 
to continue the late leader's legacy (Haaretz, March 10, 2015). Indeed, in terms of national ethos Kulanu voters are 
in-between left and right, but somewhat closer in scores to Likud than to Yesh Atid.  
7. Conclusion 
On March 17, 2015, at exactly twenty-three minutes past noon, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu posted a Facebook 
message, warning that the right-wing rule in Israel was in danger because the Arab voters were flocking in droves, as he 
put it, to the polling stations. Netanyahu indicated that Arab voters were bussed by left-wing NGOs and he urged his 
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supporters to work harder and close the gap.  
White House Spokesman Josh Earnest immediately called Netanyahu's appeal to his voters a cynical Election Day tactic, 
and noted that it was a transparent effort to marginalize Arab-Israeli citizens and their right to democratic participation. 
During the following weekend, President Barack Obama warned that Netanyahu's last-minute alarm call to his voters 
was endangering Israel’s democratic foundations (The Times of Israel, March 25, 2015).  
Likud's opponents at home proved cruder in their reactions. Yitzhak Herzog, the Labor Chairman who lost the election, 
slammed Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in a series of meetings and TV interviews. According to Herzog, 
Netanyahu chose to humiliate 20 percent of Israeli citizens for the sake of his election campaign, and denied them the 
status that they deserve as citizens with equal rights. As stated by Herzog, in his harsh words against one-fifth of Israeli 
citizens, Netanyahu defied Jewish ethics and dismantled the human mosaic of Israeli society. When Herzog was asked, 
in an interview broadcast on the three national television channels 1, 2 and 10, what he learned from the election results, 
his reply was: "There is a rightist public that is deeply connected to Likud that Netanyahu reached in the final days. He 
[Netanyahu] used the most fraudulent and racist utterances that exist. And it worked!" Herzog also commented that 
Netanyahu "more or less defined half the nation as traitors" (Lis, 2015). 
Rabbah said: "A man is not held responsible for what he says when in distress" (Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba 
Bathra, Folio 16a. (1948). The Jews' College Translation. London, UK: Soncino Press). Yet Herzog's comments, as well 
as those made by the White House officials, indicate poor judgment − and above all, deep misunderstanding of Israeli 
politics. It was no coincidence that the joint Arab party running for the Knesset announced its major goal as preventing 
another right-wing government. The ambition of the Palestinian population − particularly the part of it that is considered 
moderate and refrains from violence − is to turn Israel from a Jewish state into a state that belongs equally to all its 
citizens. As Ayman Odeh, who heads the Arab party put it, when interviewed a few days before the elections: "I want 
two nations here by choice. I want two cultures here" (Schulman, 2015). In a passionate Martin-Luther-King-style 
speech in the Knesset, after the Arab party succeeded in gaining the unprecedented result of thirteen seats for Arab 
representatives, Odeh announced:  
Recognition of national rights does not take anything away from the rest of the citizenry. […] We will continue 
to demand to be recognized as a national group, which is entitled to full civil and national equality, and we will 
struggle for it (Green, 2015). 
This study added to the common wisdom that identities are a key in voter behavior, the dimension of different forms of 
national ethos that shape identities and interweave with them. The research data demonstrates how left and right differ 
in their concepts on issues of national ethos, with right-wing voters tending to adopt republican attitudes of patriotism, 
siege mentality and trust in political leadership, whereas left-wing voters support a positive view of the Supreme Court. 
However, the data also reveals that the ethos clash should not necessarily be sketched as a dichotomy, but rather as a 
continuum where various parties are located on a spectrum between the two poles. When drawn rather as a scale, we 
can notice how republicanism and liberalism not only oppose each other but also intermingle. The centrist parties 
positioned at the left might show certain attributes of right-wing concepts in terms of trust in political leadership or high 
scores of patriotism; some religious parties situated at the right might prove low scores of patriotism resembling rather a 
liberal attitude.      
Whether or not the solution to the tense relationship between Arabs and Jews within the mandatory borders of Israel 
(that is – without the Palestinians who live in the occupied territories) should be the abolition of the idea of Israel as a 
Jewish state is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, by joining the choir accusing Netanyahu − and therefore, 
his voters too − of racism, Herzog and other left-wing leaders have missed the point. On March 17, 2015, they lost the 
chance to be in power because at least for the last four decades, the identities that dictate the power structure of Israeli 
politics are shaped by the results of the ongoing struggle between the different forms of national ethos. The voters who 
took Netanyahu's warning seriously and headed to the polling stations did so because a liberal rival form of ethos was 
threatening their republican national ethos. If Likud voters drove in hordes to the polls, they did so because they feared 
those attempting to harm the idea of a Jewish state, whether they are anti-Zionist Arabs or Jews who adopted a liberal 
attitude. 
Racism had nothing to do with the victory of the Likud. As always, it was all about identities, and most of all – the 
forms of national ethos that shape these identities. If ever asked for some good advice, I would enlighten Herzog and 
other left-wing leaders with the secret of the ongoing stagnation in Israeli politics by using a jokey variant of the 
snowclone imprinted by Bill Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign (Galoozis, 2012): it's the national ethos, stupid! 
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